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Creditors' vs. Debtors' Rights Under
Alaska Foreclosure Law: Which Way
Does the Balance Swing?
This Note examines traditional secured transaction law in
Alaska as well as recent developments in the judiciary and legisla-
ture that have helped shape the balance of rights and protections
currently offered to mortgage creditors and debtors. To better judge
the choices Alaska has made in establishing this balance, the Note
compares Alaska's choices to the secured transaction laws and re-
lated policies in California, Oregon and Washington. The Note
concludes with the view that while the recent changes to the Alaska
statutorj scheme have moved the balance more in the debtors'favor,
the scheme as a whole still largely favors creditors, and that given
the boom or bust nature of the Alaskan economy, which is still
largely dependent upon the swings of the oil industry, the legislature
should take the opportunity to move the balance more toward the
center.
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the common law, a creditor holding a promissory note
secured by a mortgage1 or deed of trust2 on real property has two
1. A mortgage is "an interest in land created by a written instrument pro-
viding security for the performance of a duty or the payment of a debt." BLACK'S
LAW DICrIONARY 1009 (6th ed. 1990). In traditional common law, and still in cer-
tain states, a mortgage is regarded as "a conveyance of the legal title.., subject to
defeasance on payment of the debt or performance of the duty." Id. at 1010. In
most other states, including Alaska, a mortgage is regarded as a form of lien, i.e. a
pledge or security, rather than an actual conveyance. Id. The mortgagor is "that
party to a mortgage who gives legal title or a lien to the mortgagee to secure the
mortgage loan." Id. at 1012. The mortgagor is therefore the debtor, and the
mortgagee is the party that takes or receives the pledge, Le. the creditor.
2. A deed of trust is "an instrument ... taking the place and serving the uses
of a mortgage, by which the legal title to real property is placed in one or more
trustees, to secure the repayment of a sum of money or the performance of other
conditions." Id. at 414. A grantor is the party offering the deed to property to
the trustee as the collateral for a loan obligation, ie. the debtor, and a beneficiary
is the party for whom the property is held in trust, i.e. the creditor. Under Alaska
law, "a deed of trust, given to secure an indebtedness, shall be treated as a mort-
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possible remedies following default and acceleration of the loan
obligation: the creditor may foreclose the security, or may ignore
the security and seek a personal judgment on the note. Further-
more, if permitted by statute and if the mortgage or deed of trust
so provides, the creditor may foreclose on the property either judi-
cially or nonjudicially.4 Each type of remedy is associated with dif-
ferent rights and protections for both creditors and debtors. Of-
ten, efforts to recover under one of these remedies will not satisfy
the debt in full. Creditors may therefore try to recover under sev-
eral alternative remedies, either within a single complaint, in si-
multaneous yet separate claims or in sequential actions.
State law determines which remedies are available to creditors
and debtors, what rights will be associated with each remedy and
whether separate or subsequent actions may be used to ensure
collection of the full debt obligation. If a state does allow separate
or subsequent actions, state law will likewise dictate the order in
which the remedies may be pursued. By crafting statutory schemes
regarding foreclosure and having these laws interpreted in the
courts, state governments carefully balance the rights and protec-
tions between creditors and debtors, and between judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosure. While the same general remedies and pro-
tections are common throughout the states, the manner in which
each legislature limits and balances these components makes
nearly all the states unique, with some states more favorable to
creditors and others more favorable to debtors.
This Note examines traditional secured transaction law in
Alaska as well as recent developments in the judiciary and legisla-
ture that have helped shape the balance of rights and protections
currently offered to mortgage creditors and debtors. To better
judge the choices Alaska has made in establishing this balance, the
Note compares the options chosen by three other states. Part II
begins with an outline of general common law rights and protec-
gage of real estate .... The person who makes or executes the deed of trust shall
be indexed as 'mortgagor,' and the trustee and the beneficiary . .. as the
'mortgagees."' ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.110 (Michie 1996).
3. When a debtor breaches the loan agreement, i.e. defaults, normally the
creditor has the right to make the entire debt due and payable, which is called
"acceleration." GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE
FINANCE LAW § 1.1 (2d ed. 1985).
4. Nonjudicial foreclosure results when the creditor sells the property with-
out first instituting an action in court to secure a decree of foreclosure and order
of sale. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.70(a) (Michie 1996). This is also known as




tions associated with particular remedies. It then looks more
deeply at secured transaction law in California, which is the most
unique among the states, and sets the standard after which several
states have modeled their own statutory schemes. Finally, Part II
examines the law in Oregon and Washington, states faced with
policy considerations similar to those confronting Alaska, yet
whose statutory schemes differ significantly from Alaska's.
Part III examines secured transaction law in Alaska, including
recent legislative and judicial developments in the field. Part IV
analyzes the policy goals, similar to those held by the states studied
in Part II, that underlie the Alaska statutory scheme. Part IV then
compares the manner in which all four states choose to reflect
these policy goals in balancing the rights and remedies of creditors
and debtors, and measures where Alaska falls on the spectrum of
creditor-debtor rights. Part V concludes with the view that while
the recent changes to the Alaska statutory scheme have moved the
balance more in the debtors' favor, the scheme as a whole still
largely favors creditors. Although the vulnerability of debtors may
seem less pressing due to recent prosperity and economic diversity
that should provide greater stability to the traditionally "boom or
bust" Alaska economy,' debtors remain in need of additional pro-
tection, and the legislature should work to move the creditor-
debtor balance more toward the center.
5. By 1986, "nearly 90[%] of Alaska's revenue [came] from oil and gas taxes
and royalties." Sharp Decline In Oil Prices Forcing Alaska Into Recession,
SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 17, 1986, at B1. Thus the economic fortunes of the state
relied almost entirely on the oil industry, as shown by the "decade-long cycle of
expansion and speculation" leading up to the sudden drop in oil prices in 1985,
and by the deep recession that followed. Michael Zielenziger, Overbuilding In
Alaska Makes Boom Go Bust, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 27, 1987, at 1F; see infra notes
211-15 and accompanying text.
A large cash infusion as part of the Exxon Valdez oil spill cleanup and the oil
price increase resulting from the Gulf War were largely responsible for pulling
Alaska out of that recession. See Gloria Collins, Residential Real Estate Bounces
Back, ALASKA BUS. MONTHLY, May 1, 1991, at 14; Jeffrey Richardson, An-
chorage's Recession Recovery Is Slow... But Real, ALASKA BUS. MONTHLY,
Dec. 1, 1990, at 33. In addition, advances in the construction, tourism, timber,
fishing and hard rock mining industries have not only helped to pull the state out
of the recession, but have given the economy a more diversified foundation with
which to face any future fluctuations in oil prices. See Governor Tony Knowles,




II. REMEDIES AND PROTECTIONS IN OTHER STATES
A. General State Law
1. Available remedies. Traditionally, a creditor may choose
between two general categories of remedies in order to collect on a
defaulted promissory note secured by a mortgage or a deed of
trust. The first type of remedy is foreclosure of the security.6
However, the use of a mortgage or a deed of trust to secure the
debt does not by itself imply that the creditor is to look only or
primarily to foreclosure of the security for payment of the debt.'
Thus, in the absence of a statutory restriction, "the holder of the
note and mortgage is not required first to foreclose the mortgage
but may bring his action on the note alone."8 This is the second
general type of creditor remedy. While a judgment on the note
merges the debt into the judgment, it does not merge the
mortgage, and therefore "does not preclude its foreclosure in a
subsequent suit ... or the exercise of [nonjudicial foreclosure]." 9
Where it is not prohibited by statute, "the mortgagee may pursue
all his remedies concurrently or successively.
10
While a suit on the note is relatively straightforward, the spe-
cifics of foreclosure proceedings vary widely among the states. In
a large majority of the states, foreclosure can be broken down into
two types: judicial and nonjudicial.' When viewed in light of the
6. Foreclosure is "[a] proceeding in equity whereby a mortgagee either takes
title to or forces the sale of the mortgagor's property in satisfaction of the debt."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (6th ed. 1990).
7. See 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 517 (1996).
8. 3 LEONARD B. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES OF
REAL PROPERTY § 1572 (8th ed. 1928). For examples of such actions, see Ander-
son v. Warren, 164 P.2d 221, 223 (Okla. 1945); Universal Credit Co. v. Wyoming
Motor Co., 136 P.2d 512, 515 (Wyo. 1943); Page v. Ford, 131 P. 1013, 1021 (Or.
1913).
9. 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 524 (1996). Some good examples of judicial
foreclosure are Berg v. Liberty Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 428 A.2d 347 (Del. 1981);
Foothills Holding Corp. v. Tulsa Rig, Reel & Mfg., 393 P.2d 749 (Colo. 1964);
Klondike, Inc. v. Blair, 211 So. 2d 41 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
10. JONES, supra note 8, § 1565 (citing Gilman v. Illinois & Miss. Tel. Co., 91
U.S. 603, 616 (1875)).
11. Only Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, New Jersey, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Ver-
mont and Wisconsin have no provisions for nonjudicial foreclosure. See A.B.A.
SECTION ON REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST LAW, FORECLOSURE LAW &
RELATED REMEDIES: A STATE BY STATE DIGEST (Sidney A. Keyles et al. eds.
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"delay and expense incident to [judicial foreclosure],"' 2 nonjudicial
foreclosure offers substantial benefits to creditors. It provides a
less expensive, quicker and easier method than judicial foreclosure
for satisfying a loan obligation. There is no need to petition the
court for a deed of foreclosure and an order of sale,' and notice
requirements are usually less rigorous.' Also, by replacing the
lengthy, complicated procedures that make judicial foreclosure
unattractive to creditors, nonjudicial foreclosure helps alleviate the
workload of often overcrowded court systems. Yet to offset the
benefits nonjudicial foreclosure affords creditors, in most jurisdic-
tions the sales must be confirmed by a court, and in others a sher-
iff, public trustee or other official must conduct the sale. 5
2. Redemption. To further level the playing field between
creditors and debtors, every state offers the debtor/mortgagor
some form of equitable redemption, whereby the mortgagor has
the right to perform his or her full obligation under the mortgage
and thereby have title to the security restored free of the
mortgage." The right to cure the default under equitable
redemption is available only after default and before a valid
foreclosure sale. 7 Some states offer a further statutory right to de-
accelerate the loan obligation by allowing the mortgagor to pay the
amount that would be due at that time if no default had occurred. 8
This right, which is becoming increasingly common among the
states," runs for a set length of time following default, but usually
ends before the foreclosure sale. The process is often termed
"reinstatement," because when the debtor de-accelerates the
obligation in this manner, the mortgage or deed of trust is
reinstated as if no default had occurred. To prevent abuse of the
reinstatement process, states often require the debtor to pay the
creditor's legal fees and other costs associated with the default, and
may also prescribe the number of times a debtor may reinstate the
loan obligation in this manner before the creditor has a right to
1995) [hereinafter DIGEST].
12. JONES, supra note 8, § 2285.
13. See id.
14. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 7.19.
15. See 55 AM. JUR. 2D Mortgages § 532 (1996).
16. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 7.1.
17. See id.
18. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 2924c(a)(1) (West 1987 & Supp. 1997); OR.
REV. STAT. § 86.753 (1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.090 (West 1990).




In addition to equitable redemption and reinstatement, about
one-half of the states have established statutory rights of redemp-
tion that allow the mortgagor to redeem the property for a set pe-
riod after a valid foreclosure sale.2' To redeem the property under
these rights, the debtor must pay the purchaser the foreclosure sale
price plus any taxes or other costs paid by the purchaser due to the
sale.2 Many states enhance the benefits of nonjudicial foreclosure
by offering a statutory right of redemption following a judicial
foreclosure sale, but not following a nonjudicial sale. However,
the states usually offset any restriction of the debtor's right of re-
demption by restricting the creditor's right to a deficiency judg-
ment.24
3. Deficiency judgments. Since most foreclosure sales are
forced sales, the price obtained for the property is rarely the full
market value as reflected in the mortgage or deed of trust. For this
reason, most states allow the creditor to obtain a judgment for any
deficiency between the amount of the debt obligation and the
amount received from the foreclosure sale.' This is usually
accomplished by directing the courts in judicial foreclosure
proceedings to render a personal judgment for any deficiency that
remains after applying the proceeds from the foreclosure sale to
the debt obligation.26 In this manner, a complaint requesting both
foreclosure and deficiency decrees is viewed as stating only one
cause of action, and the deficiency judgment is considered a
necessary incident of a foreclosure suit.2
In economic hard times, such as the Great Depression of the
1930's and the recession in the 1970's, provisions for deficiencyjudgments have resulted in abuses by creditors. During these peri-
ods, "[f]oreclosures were pervasive, and few had the courage or the
capital to bid at foreclosure sales... [which,] in turn, led to large
deficiency judgments against mortgagors, resulting in the
20. See id.
21. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 12-1282(A) (West 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-2414(a) (Supp. 1993); NEv. REV. STAT. § 21.210 (1996).
22- See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 7.1.
23. See infra notes 55-56, 87,89, 122, 126 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 57, 64, 91, 94, 127-29, 132 and accompanying text.
25. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 8.1.
26. See id. § 7.4; Perpetual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Braun, 242 S.E.2d 407 (S.C.
1978).
27. See Shepherd v. Pepper, 133 U.S. 626, 651-52 (1890); Jamaica Sav. Bank v.
M. S. Investing Co., 8 N.E.2d 493,494 (N.Y. 1937).
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'complete ruin of the real estate mortgage debtor."' The mortga-
gor, at either a judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure sale, could
"acquire the property for pennies on the dollar, sell the property
on the open market at a much higher price, and then sue the bor-
rower for the deficiency." 29 In this manner, the mortgagor had an
incentive to conduct the foreclosure sale in a way that created the
possibility of "a double recovery at the expense of the financially
burdened borrower."0 In response, many states enacted anti-
deficiency statutes that remain to this day.3'
In judicial foreclosure, where courts have greater oversight
and responsibility for the proceedings, anti-deficiency legislation
often takes the form of "fair value," "minimum bid" or "upset
price" statutes.32 These laws allow a court to determine the fair
market value of the security and then either to refuse confirmation
of the foreclosure sale if the price is below the "upset price" or
"minimum bid," or to apply the determined "fair value" of the
property when calculating the deficiency from the sale.33 Since
nonjudicial foreclosure is often outside the oversight of the court,
anti-deficiency statutes often entirely eliminate the ability to sup-
plement deficient nonjudicial foreclosure sales.
Since most states allow a creditor to pursue foreclosure and an
action on the note concurrently or consecutively, a creditor may
choose to collect on a deficiency from a foreclosure sale by filing a
subsequent suit on the note, or vice versa.3' However, if a subse-
quent and separate action for one type of remedy is filed to sup-
plement a deficient judgment on another type, some state courts
may find that the claim preclusive effect of res judicata creates an
28. Carol Bums, Comment, Will Refinancing Your Home Mortgage Risk Your
Life Savings? Refinancing And California Code Of Civil Procedure Section 580b,
43 UCLA L. REV. 2077, 2081 (1996) (quoting Sol P. Perlman, Mortgage Defi-
ciency Judgments During An Economic Depression, 20 VA. L. REV. 771, 771
(1934)).
29. James S. Hering, Comment, Real Property Foreclosure In Texas: What Is
Deficient About The Texas Deficiency Judgment Statute?, 37 S. TEx. L. REV. 377,
380 (1996).
30. Id.
31. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 8.3.
32. See id. §§ 7.16, 8.3.
33. See id.
34. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976 & Supp. 1997); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 686 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997); OR. REV. STAT. §
86.770(2)(a) (1988 & Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.100 (West
1990 & Supp. 1997).
35. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 3, § 8.1.
1997]
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election of remedies and thus bars the subsequent action. 6 In ad-
dition to the courts, state legislatures may also eliminate deficiency
judgments by enacting one-action rules that create an election of
remedies.
4. One-action rules. To increase the protections for debtors,
a number of states have enacted statutes, called "one-action rules,"
that require a creditor to pursue its remedies in a single action, and
usually require a mortgagee to exhaust the security first when
satisfying the debt." Seeking a specific remedy will preclude anyr
other remedies that might normally be available to the creditor.
Typically, the purpose behind such one-action rules is
"to protect the mortgagor against multiplicity of actions when
the separate actions, though theoretically distinct, are so closely
connected that normally they can and should be decided in one
suit... [and] to compel a creditor who has taken a mortgage on
land to exhaust his security before attempting to reach any un-
mortgaged property to satisfy his claim., 39
Along with the anti-deficiency statutes mentioned above, one-
action rules are intended to guide the creditor back toward judicial
foreclosure, which offers greater oversight protection by the courts
and lengthier proceedings than those under nonjudicial foreclo-
sure, thus allowing a greater opportunity for equitable redemption
or reinstatement.
The balancing of rights and protections for creditors, such as
36. The doctrine of res judicata provides that "a judgment 'on the merits' in a
prior suit involving the same parties or their privies bars [a subsequent claim]
based on the same cause of action." Lawlor v. National Screen Serv., 349 U.S.
322,326 (1955). The claim extinguished by the first judgment "includes all rights
of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of
the transaction.., out of which the action arose." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUDGMENTS § 24(a) (1982).
37. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West 1980 & Supp. 1997);
IDAHO CODE § 6-101 (1990 & Supp. 1996); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.430
(Michie 1996); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-37-1 (1996). Other states that have some
kind of one-action rules are Connecticut, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Montana, Ne-
braska, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, South Carolina, South Dakota and
Washington. See generally DIGEST, supra note 11.
38. See DIGEST, supra note 11, at xiv.
39. FDIC v. Shoop, 2 F.3d 948, 950 (Mont. 1993) (quoting GEORGE E.
OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 334, at 701 (2d ed. 1970));
see also Walker v. Community Bank, 518 P.2d 329, 333 (Cal. 1974); Milton
Widem, Deficiency Judgments Arising Out of Foreclosure Actions, REAL ESTATE
FORECLOSURES 61, 68 (James L. Lipscomb et al. eds., 1992).
40. See Bums, supra note 28, at 35.
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the remedy of nonjudicial disclosure and deficiency judgments,
with rights and protections for debtors, such as anti-deficiency
statutes and one-action rules, underlies the foreclosure and se-
cured transaction law in each state. Examining the statutory
schemes in a few surrounding states will be helpful in analyzing the
current and former foreclosure law in Alaska.
B. California Jurisprudence
1. Available remedies. In California, creditors faced with a
defaulted mortgage or deed of trust may choose either judicial or
nonjudicial foreclosure, or may ignore the security and file suit on
the underlying debt. If pursuing judicial foreclosure, filing the
complaint is adequate notice of default, absent a contrary
contractual arrangement.41 Once the complaint is filed, the parties
conduct discovery, and then, either upon motion or after a trial,
the court may grant a decree of foreclosure. This process can
take anywhere from a few months to several years, depending
upon the length of discovery, the necessity for a trial and the status
of the court's calendar.43
If the court grants a decree of foreclosure, the creditor obtains
a writ of sale from the court clerk, which the creditor then gives to
the sheriff or receiver appointed by the court. The sheriff or re-
ceiver then executes a notice of levy, and serves the notice on the
debtor." So long as the debtor does not have a right of redemp-
tion, the creditor must wait at least 120 days after the notice of levy
has been served before a notice of sale can then be served on the
debtor.45 The notice of sale will set the date and the specifics of the
foreclosure sale, and the sale may not occur until at least twenty
days after service of the notice of sale.46 If the debtor does have a
right of redemption, then "notice of sale may be given upon entry
of the judgment for sale of the property," and the creditor need
not wait 120 days.4
Since the lengthy and detailed nature of judicial foreclosure
usually results in delay and expensive legal fees, the California
41. See, e.g., Title Guar. & Trust Co. v. Fraternal Fin. Co., 30 P.2d 515, 516
(Cal. 1934).
42 See DIGEST, supra note 11, at 41.
43. See id.
44. See id. at 43; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 700.015 (West 1987 & Supp. 1997).
45. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 701.545 (West 1987).
46. See id.
47. Id. § 729.010(b)(2) (Supp 1997).
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legislature enacted the more streamlined option of nonjudicial
foreclosure. Nonjudicial foreclosure by trustee's sale commences
once a notice of default is recorded in the office of the county re-
corder." This notice must be mailed to the debtor within ten busi-
ness days of the filing date.49 At least three months after the notice
of default has been filed, but at least twenty days prior to the fore-
closure sale, the creditor must mail to the debtor a notice of sale
giving the date and specifics of the foreclosure sale. 0 As is readily
apparent, nonjudicial foreclosure in California is a much shorter,
less complex and less expensive option than judicial foreclosure.
2. Redemption. California has long recognized the common
law equity of redemption. 1 In both judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings, until completion of the foreclosure sale,
the debtor has the ability to redeem the security by paying the full
amount due under the mortgage or deed of trust plus any damages
caused by the default. 2 In addition to equitable redemption, a
debtor in California may reinstate the mortgage or deed of trust by
paying all of the principal, interest payments and other costs due
on the obligation at the time of reinstatement, plus any costs
associated with the default.53 The debtor may exercise the right of
reinstatement until the court issues a decree of foreclosure in a
judicial proceeding, or until five business days prior to the date set
for the foreclosure sale in a nonjudicial proceeding.-"
In addition to the rights of equitable redemption and rein-
statement, the debtor may exercise a statutory right to redeem the
property after the foreclosure sale whenever a creditor retains a
right to a deficiency judgment.5 5 Once the sale is completed, the
debtor may redeem the property up to one year after the date of
the sale, except if the proceeds of the sale are sufficient to satisfy
the underlying debt, in which case the debtor has three months
from the date of sale to redeem the property. Since the creditor
has no right to a deficiency judgment in nonjudicial foreclosure,
the debtor likewise has no right of redemption following a trustee's
48. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
49. See id. § 2924b(b)(1).
50. See id. § 2924b(b)(2), (c)(3).
51. See Wilson v. Brannan, 27 Cal. 258,270 (1865).
52. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2903,2905 (1993).
53. See id. § 2924c(a)(1).
54. See id.
55. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 729.010 (Supp. 1997).




3. Deficiency judgments. The statutory scheme in California
has intricate provisions for deficiency judgments that depend upon
the remedy sought by the creditor. A deficiency judgment is
allowed following a foreclosure sale, so long as the mortgagee has
not waived the option and it is not prohibited under California
Code of Civil Procedure section 580b.' However, a deficiency
judgment is limited to the amount by which the full debt obligation
exceeds the fair market value of the property, not the amount it
exceeds the purchase price from the sale. This "fair value"
provision thereby remedies the evil of double recovery often
associated with deficiency judgments.
Creditors may not obtain a deficiency judgment where the
mortgage "is given to secure the unpaid portion of the purchase
price of real property."59 The character of the note determines
whether the loan is classified as a purchase money loan, and this
classification is made according to the facts at the time the loan
was made rather than when notice of default was filed.W° If the loan
was given by a vendor, or by a third-party lender to secure pay-
ment of a borrower-occupied dwelling to be used by four or fewer
families, there can be no deficiency decree.6 The purpose behind
this statute is to discourage vendors from overvaluing the security,
and to avoid burdening defaulting purchasers with personal liabil-
ity.62 One concern with burdening the mortgagors is that this
would aggravate the economic downturn responsible for the de-
cline in property values that caused the deficiency in the first
place.63
In California, there is virtually a complete bar on deficiency
judgments following nonjudicial foreclosure sales.' This provision
57. See id. § 726(b).
58. See id.; Roseleaf Corp. v. Cheirighino, 378 P.2d 97, 99 (Cal. 1963) (en
banc).
59. Winklemen v. Sides, 88 P.2d 147, 158 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); CAL. CIV.
PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1972 & Supp. 1997).
60. See Andrew A. Bassak, Comment, Secured Transaction Guarantors In
California: Is It Time To Reevaluate The Validity And Timing Of Waivers Of
Rights?, 32 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 265,270 (1992).
61. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b.
62. See Roseleaf, 378 P.2d at 102.
63. See id
64. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d. The only exceptions are for instru-




is intended "to put judicial enforcement on a parity with private
enforcement," because "[i]f a creditor wishes a deficiency judg-
ment, [he must choose judicial foreclosure, and] his sale is subject
to statutory redemption rights. If he wishes a sale resulting in non-
redeemable title, he must forgo the right to a deficiency judgment
[and choose nonjudicial foreclosure]. In either case, the debtor is
protected." 5
4. One-action rule. Secured transaction law in California is
perhaps best known for its one-action rule. While a creditor in
California may attempt to ignore the security and instead sue on
the underlying debt, California Civil Procedure Code section 726
states "there can be but one form of action for the recovery of any
debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon
real property[,] ... which action shall be in accordance with the
provisions of this chapter [concerning actions for the foreclosure of
mortgages]."66 Thus, if a mortgagee files a suit on the note, the
mortgagor may invoke the statute as an affirmative defense in
order to force the mortgagee judicially to foreclose the security
instead.67
If the mortgagor does not assert this defense, and the mortga-
gee begins a foreclosure action to remedy a prior deficient judg-
ment on the note, the mortgagor can invoke the sanction effect of
the statute." Under the sanction effect, the subsequent action will
be dismissed, since "where a creditor elects to obtain a personal
money judgment rather than enforce his mortgage, the effect of
the election is to waive the right to foreclose on his security.,
69
Thus, by obtaining a judgment on the note, the creditor "loses all
right to his security, thereby relegating himself to the position of
an ordinary judgment creditor."7 The practical effect of the stat-
ute is to eliminate the option of pursuing an action on the note first
and then judicially foreclosing the security to recover any defi-
ciency from the judgment on the note. Instead, "property given
as security furnishes the primary fund for the payment of the debt
and this fund must be exhausted before recourse can be had to the
65. Roseleaf, 378 P.2d at 102.
66. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (Supp. 1997).
67. See Bassak, supra note 60, at 267.
68. See Fernandez-Lopez v. Fernandez-Lopez, 37 B.R. 664, 669 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1984); James v. P.C.S. Ginning Co., 276 Cal. App. 2d 19,22 (1969).
69. James, 276 Cal. App. 2d at 23.
70. Id.
71. See Bassak, supra note 60, at 267.
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maker of the note."' Thus, "section 726 is a 'security first' rule as
well as a 'one-action' rule."73
C. Oregon Jurisprudence
1. Available remedies. Unlike California or Alaska, in
Oregon a creditor's remedies following default of a secured note
are not entirely the same for a mortgage as for a deed of trust. A
creditor holding either of these securities may judicially foreclose
on the property,7 or may ignore the property and sue on the note.75
Only a creditor holding a deed of trust may elect to foreclose the
security nonjudicially.
For judicial foreclosure, Oregon does not require the creditor
to give the debtor notice of default or intent to foreclose; the credi-
tor need only file a complaint.' If foreclosure is contested, discov-
ery proceeds and may result in either summary judgment or a trial,
after which the court may issue a judgment and decree of foreclo-
sure and sale directing the sheriff to conduct a foreclosure sale."
After a decree of foreclosure and sale is entered, the sheriff must
give notice of the sale to the debtor and then publish the notice in
a local newspaper at least once a week for four consecutive weeks,
with the last publication occurring at least one week before the
sale.79 Thus, the sale cannot take place until approximately six
weeks after the decree of foreclosure and sale is entered.
In Oregon, nonjudicial foreclosure is a right found in all trust
deeds, and is accomplished through foreclosure by advertisement
and sale.s Before a trustee's sale may occur, the creditor or trus-
72. Winklemen v. Sides, 88 P.2d 147, 156 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); see also Rose-
leaf Corp. v. Cheirighino, 378 P.2d 97, 98 (Cal. 1963) (noting that in California, a
creditor must look to the security before enforcing the debt).
73. See Bassak, supra note 60, at 267.
74. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 86.710, 88.010 (1988).
75. See Director of Veterans' Affairs v. Bierlein, 859 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Or. Ct.
App. 1993).
76. See OR. REV. STAT. § 86.710. A trust deed "is deemed to be a mortgage
on real property and is subject to all laws relating to mortgages on real property
except to the extent that such laws are inconsistent with the provisions [for non-
judicial foreclosure], in which event [those provisions] shall control." Id. § 86.715.
77. See George M. Platt, The Uniform Land Security Interest Act: Vehicle For
Reform Of Oregon Secured Land Transaction Law, 69 Or. L. Rev. 847, 891
(1990).
78. See DIGEST, supra note 11, at 466; OR. REV. STAT. §§ 88.010, .060, .080.
79. See OR. REV. STAT. § 23.450(2) (1988).
80. See id. § 86.710.
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tee must file a notice of default and election to sell the property
with the county clerk."' After filing the notice of default and intent
to sell, the creditor or trustee must then serve notice of the sale to
the debtor at least 120 days before the date of sale.u Nonjudicial
foreclosure also has a publication requirement identical to that for
judicial foreclosure, except that the last 8 publication must occur at
least twenty days before the date of sale.
2. Redemption. The common law equitable right of
redemption is recognized for both judicial and nonjudicial
foreclosure, regardless of whether the debt is secured by a
mortgage or a deed of trusty Equitable redemption in a judicial
foreclosure proceeding is accomplished by paying the entire debt
obligation, assumin there was an acceleration clause in the
security agreement. In a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding, the
debtor has the added right to de-accelerate the debt and reinstate
the trust deed if the default can be cured by paying any missed or
inadequate installments prior to five days before the foreclosure
sale. 6
In addition to common law equitable redemption, both mort-
gagors and trust deed debtors have a statutory right to redeem the
property after a judicial foreclosure saleY This may be accom-
plished at any time within 180 days after the date of the foreclo-
sure sale by paying the amount of the buyer's purchase money and
other expenses, plus a set rate of interest." If the creditor fore-
closes nonjudically, the debtor has no statutory right to redeem the
property following the foreclosure sale.89
3. Deficiency judgments. In Oregon, deficiency judgments are
allowed only in specific instances. The Oregon Supreme Court has
suggested that for mortgages other than purchase money
mortgages," judicial foreclosure and an action on the underlying
81. See id. § 86.735(3).
82. See id. § 86.740(1).
83. See id. § 86.750.
84. See Sellwood v. Gray, 5 P. 196, 198 (Or. 1884).
85. See id.
86. See OR. REV. STAT. § 86.753.
87. See id. §§ 23.560, 88.080.
88. See id.
89. See id. § 86.770(1).
90. A mortgage is a purchase money mortgage or deed of trust if
[it] is given to a vendor to secure the unpaid balance of the purchase
price of real property or if the mortgage is given to a lender or any other
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debt are not considered inconsistent remedies, so each remedy
may be used to supplement a deficient judgment resulting from the
other.' For purchase money mortgages, a deficiency judgment is
not allowed following foreclosure.' As for deeds of trust, a
deficiency judgment should be included in a judgment resulting
from judicial foreclosure of non-residential trust deeds,93 but is not
allowed following judicial foreclosure of a residential trust deed or
any nonjudicial foreclosure."
4. One-action rule. Absent "statutory prohibition," there is
no one-action rule or election of remedies concerning secured
creditors rights in Oregon. 5 Consequently, "a mortgagee may
pursue all statutory remedies concurrently or successively." 6
Thus, a mortgagee or trust deed beneficiary may join claims for
judicial foreclosure of the security and a personal judgment on the
note in one action," proceed on the note and then judicially
foreclose the security, or judicially foreclose the security and sue
on the note.96 One statutory prohibition that does create an
election of remedies concerns purchase money mortgages or deeds
of trust, since a secured creditor is not entitled to a deficiency
person to secure up to $50,000 of the unpaid balance of the purchase
price of real property used by the purchaser as the primary or secondary
single family residence of the purchaser.
Id. § 88.075.
91. See Jesse v. Birchell, 257 P.2d 255, 259 (Or. 1953). The reason there is no
election of remedies problem presented by concurrently or simultaneously pur-
suing a foreclosure proceeding and an action on the note is that the Oregon Su-
preme Court has determined that these remedies are not inconsistent with each
other, but are rather both "aids to assist plaintiffs in the accomplishment of the
desired end result; that is, the collection of money due them." Id.
92 See OR. REV. STAT. § 88.070.
93. Even if the creditor does not join a claim on the note to his or her foreclo-
sure claim, so long as the creditor has not waived the right to a deficiency judg-
ment, if the creditor has such a right, the court should issue a personal judgment
against the debtor for the amount of the debt along with its decree of foreclosure
and sale. See id. § 88.010.
94. See id. § 86.770(2)-(3). A residential trust deed is defined as "a trust deed
on property upon which are situated four or fewer residential units and one of the
residential units is occupied as the principal residence of the [debtor], the
[debtor's] spouse or the [debtor's] minor or dependent child at the time a trust
deed foreclosure is commenced." Id. § 86.705(3) (Supp. 1996).
95. See State v. Bierlein, 859 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
96. Id.
97. See OR. REV. STAT. § 88.010.
98. See Platt, supra note 77, at 891.
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following foreclosure and sale of a purchase money mortgage.'
While this does not prevent the creditor from ignoring the
mortgage and suing on the note, or from pleading both remedies in
the alternative, if the creditor does so a judgment on one claim
bars any further relief.'00
The other statutory prohibition that creates an election of
remedies concerns nonjudicial foreclosure of deeds of trust. A
creditor may only foreclose a deed by trustee's sale if "[n]o action
has been instituted to recover the debt or any part of it then re-
maining . -. . or, if such action has been instituted, the action has
been dismissed. 1.. Thus, if the creditor has received a judgment in
either a suit on the debt or judicial foreclosure of the security, an
election of remedies will prevent the creditor from utilizing nonju-
dicial foreclosure to eliminate any deficiency.
D. Washington Jurisprudence
1. Available remedies. In Washington, except as provided by
statute, a deed of trust has the same legal effect as a mortgage.' 2 A
creditor holding a defaulted note secured by a deed of trust or
mortgage may "use either judicial or nonjudicial procedures to
enforce that security."'0 .Thus, the secured creditor may ignore the
security and sue on the underlying note, judicially foreclose the
security, or, so long as thi deed of trust contains a power of sale,
nonjudicially foreclose the security."
A creditor begins judicial foreclosure by filing a complaint to
foreclose the equity of redemption contained in the mortgage.' 5 If
the court finds for the creditor, it will render a judgment and de-
cree of foreclosure ordering the sale of the mortgaged premises to
satisfy the mortgage and the costs of the action.' The court may,
at that time, "take judicial notice of economic conditions" and fix a
99. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
100. See Bierlein, 859 P.2d at 1184.
101. OR. REv. STAT. § 86.735(4) (1988).
102. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 61.24.020 (West 1990).
103. Fluke Capital & Management Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 724 P.2d 356, 363
(Wash. 1986).
104. See John D. Sullivan, Rights of Washington Junior Lienors in Nonjudicial
Foreclosure - Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. United States, 115 Wash.2d
52, 793 P.2d 969, clarified, reconsideration denied, 800 P.2d 1124 (Wash. 1990), 67
Wash. L. Rev. 235,237 (1992).
105. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.040.
106. See id. § 61.12.060.
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minimum or upset price below which it will not confirm the sale."
At least thirty days prior to the foreclosure sale, the creditor must
serve notice of sale on the judgment debtor and the judgment
debtor's attorney.' At least four weeks prior to the foreclosure
sale, the sheriff must post the same notice of sale and must publish
a less detailed notice at least once a week in a newspaper of gen-
eral circulation."l The notice of sale served by the creditor and
posted by the sheriff must clearly inform the debtor of any avail-
able rights of possession, equitable redemption or statutory re-
demption."' Once all requirements are met, the property is sold,
the court confirms the sale and all redemption rights have lapsed,
the sheriff will issue the purchaser a deed to the property."
A beneficiary of a defaulted deed of trust may elect to nonju-
dicially foreclose the security so long as the deed contains a power
of sale, no other action to satisfy the debt is pending and the secu-
rity "is not used principally for agricultural or farming purposes.'..
Once the beneficiary elects nonjudicial foreclosure, either the
beneficiary or the trustee must mail notice of default to the credi-
tor, and must either post the same notice on the property securing
the deed or personally serve it on the debtor."' This notice must
include a clear indication of the grantor's right of equitable re-
demption and the amount necessary to reinstate the deed of
trust.114 At least thirty days after notice of default is given, and at
least ninety days before the date of the foreclosure sale, the trustee
must give notice of sale.15 The trustee must also publish the notice
of sale in a public newspaper. 6 Once all requirements have been
107. See id. The court may not set the fair market value in this manner for any
mortgage "held by the United States or by any agency, department, bureau,
board or commission thereof." Id. § 61.12.061.
108. See id. 88 6.21.030(1)(a)-(b), 61.12.090.
109. See id. § 6.21.030(2)(a)-(b).
110. See id. § 6.21.040.
111. See id. § 6.23.060.
112. Id. § 61.24.030.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. § 61.24.040. The notice must give the date and specifics of the
foreclosure sale, and must attest that no other action is pending on the debt and
that the grantor and others with a lien on the property have a right of equitable
redemption. See id. The trustee must include with the notice of sale that is
mailed to the grantor a statement reiterating that the grantor has a right to equi-
table redemption, the manner in which the default may be cured, and the fact that




met, and at least 190 days have passed from the date of default, the
trustee may sell the security at a foreclosure sale and execute a
deed for the property to the purchaser."' The purchaser is entitled
to possession of the property as soon as twenty days have passed
from the date of the foreclosure sale."8
2. Redemption. In Washington, the common law right to
equitable redemption is recognized for both judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosure. In an action for judicial foreclosure, the
mortgagor may satisfy the debt by paying the full value of the
mortgage debt plus interest and costs at any time until the date of
the foreclosure sale."' To offset the absence of post-sale
redemption rights following a trustee's sale, a grantor pursuing
nonjudicial foreclosure is given reinstatement rights. Thus, up
until eleven days before the foreclosure sale, the grantor may
reinstate the deed of trust by curing any defaults described in the
notice of default.'O If the default was caused by a failure to pay an
interest payment or installment, the grantor may cure by paying
the amount that would have been due up until that time if no
default had occurred, glus any expenses incurred by the trustee as
a result of the default.
Along with the right of equitable redemption, a judgment
debtor has a statutory right to redeem the property following a
completed judicial foreclosure sale.12 The debtor may do so by
paying the amount of the purchase price plus interest and any
taxes the purchaser paid on the property.'2 Post-sale redemption
generally may occur at any time within one year after the foreclo-
sure sale; that time is limited to eight months if (1) the mortgage
specifically declares that the mortgaged property is not used prin-
cipally for agricultural or farming purposes and (2) the complaint
expressly waives the rights to a deficiency judgment.'2 " If the prop-
117. See id.
118. See id. § 61.24.060.
119. See id. § 61.12.060.
120. See id. § 61.24.090.
121. See id.
122. See id. § 6.23.010. There is an exception to this rule. In an action to fore-
close a mortgage on real property that has been improved by a structure or struc-
tures, if the court finds the mortgagor has abandoned the property for six months
or more, the mortgagor is held to have waived its rights of redemption so long as
the property is not used primarily for agricultural purposes. See id. §§ 61.12.093,
.095.
123. See id. § 6.23.020(2).
124. See id. § 6.23.020(1). If the property fits under the statutory definition of
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erty is not an occupied homestead, or land being used at the time
for farming purposes, and if the mortgage or deed of trust does not
specifically provide otherwise, the purchaser is entitled to posses-
sion of the property during the redemption period." By statute,
there is no right of redemption following a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale."2
3. Deficiency judgments. Washington provides for limited
rights to a deficiency judgment following judicial foreclosure, but
only if the mortgage or a separate instrument, such as a note,
expressly agrees to repayment of the debt obligation in full.'2' If
the creditor is entitled to a deficiency judgment, the decree of
foreclosure should state that the balance remaining after the
foreclosure sale should be satisfied from any other property of the
mortgage debtor.'2 Any additional levy and sales necessary to
satisfy a deficiency judgment may be made under the same
execution as that for the foreclosure sale.129 To make a deficiency
judgment more fair to the debtor, when a party applies for
confirmation of the foreclosure sale, the court may, at that time,
hold a hearing to determine the fair value of the property, and may
credit this amount against the mortgage debt. 30 If the court does
so, the deficiency judgment will then entitle the creditor to only
the difference between the fair value of the property and the full
amount of the mortgage debt."' Regardless of the sale price or fair
value of the secured property, a creditor is not entitled to a
a homestead, after the foreclosure sale the purchaser must send notice to the
judgment debtor at least 40 but no more than 60 days before the applicable re-
demption period expires informing the debtor that the right of redemption will
soon expire, and giving the deadline and requirements for redeeming the prop-
erty. If the purchaser does not do so, the right of redemption is extended for an-
other six months. See id. § 6.23.030(1)-(2).
125. See id. § 6.23.110.
126. See id. § 61.24.050.
127. See id. § 61.12.050. One exception in the case of property not used pri-
marily for agricultural purposes is that a creditor is not entitled to a deficiency
judgment if the secured property has been improved by a structure or structures
and has been abandoned for six months or more. See id. §H 61.12.093-.095.
128. See id. § 61.12.070.
129. See id. § 61.12.100.
130. See id. § 61.12.060. The same exemption for mortgages held by the
United States or its agencies as that found in setting a minimum or upset bid price
applies in post-sale assignment of fair market value. See supra note 107 and ac-
companying text.
131. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060.
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deficiency judgment following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.'32
4. One-action rule. Washington has a statutory one-action
plan that prevents a creditor from foreclosing on a mortgage or
deed of trust while prosecuting or seeking execution of a judgment
for an action on the underlying debt, and vice versa."' By statute, a
nonjudicial foreclosure sale satisfies the underlying obligation
regardless of sale price or fair value, so that "the remedies of a
creditor who chooses nonjudicial procedures are limited to
foreclosure alone."' ' If the creditor elects judicial foreclosure,
then so long as a deficiency is not waived or otherwise prohibited,
and the actions are not independent and concurrent, a creditor
may satisfy the entire debt obligation through judgments both on
the security and against the debtor personally. ' Furthermore, in
an action for judicial foreclosure where the creditor is entitled to a
deficiency judgment, the court is instructed that it should include
sua sponte, as part of its decree of foreclosure, a deficiencyjudgment to be executed against the personal property of the
debtor.136
III. SECURED TRANSACTION LAW IN ALASKA
A. Traditional Rights and Remedies
Alaska secured transaction law is anchored by the same gen-
eral rights and remedies as the other states examined above. The
common law antecedents to these rights and remedies existed long
before Alaska statehood.'7 With the exception of a few minor
amendments, nearly all of the specific statutory rights, remedies
and procedures examined below were available to mortgage credi-
132. See id. § 61.24.100.
133. See id. § 61.12.120.
134. Fluke Capital & Management Servs. Co. v. Richmond, 724 P.2d 356, 363
(Wash. 1986).
135. See Hinchman v. Anderson, 72 P. 1018 (Wash. 1903). The purpose behind
the statute was "to prevent a multiplicity of suits for the same debt at the same
time." Id. at 1021.
136. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
137. See, e.g., Dikeman v. Jewel Gold Mining Co., 7 Alaska 361 (1925), aff'd,
13 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1926) (recognizing statutory redemption rights and defi-
ciency judgments in judicial foreclosures); Strong v. Gilmore, 6 Alaska 384 (1921);
Hammer v. Alaska-Ebner Gold Mines Co., 6 Alaska 193 (1919) (recognizing a
right to a deficiency judgment in judicial foreclosures).
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tors and debtors in Alaska by 1962.13
1. Available remedies. Under Alaska law, a creditor "has the
option whether to sue on the note or foreclose the security."'39 If
the creditor chooses to foreclose on the security, the creditor may
pursue judicial or, if the mortgage or deed of trust so provides,
nonjudicial foreclosure.' Through the choice of remedy pursued,
the creditor determines the rights available to the creditor and the
debtor.
Alaska does not require notice of default and acceleration be-
fore filing an action for judicial foreclosure; the only notice the
debtor need receive is the filing of the complaint. In the action,
"the court may direct the sale of the encumbered property.., and
the application of the proceeds of the sale to the payment of costs,
expenses of sale, and the amount due the plaintiff." 14 Pursuant to
the judgment of foreclosure and the order of sale, the court shall
issue a writ of execution against the secured property, and should
also determine the personal liability of the debtor for the amount
due on the underlying note.42 Notice giving the date and specifics
of the foreclosure sale must be posted not less than thirty days be-
fore the date of the sale, and must be printed once a week for four
consecutive weeks in the newspaper published nearest the prop-
erty serving as the security.' 43 Following the sale, the debtor has
the option to apply for a court order confirming the sale.'" The
court shall deny confirmation and order a resale if it determines
there were "substantial irregularities" in the proceedings of the
first sale.
1 45
In addition to judicial foreclosure, "if a deed of trust... pro-
vides that in case of default or noncompliance with the terms of
the trust, the trustee may sell the property for condition broken,
the trustee ... may execute the trust by sale of the property."1"
138. The few statutory amendments made after 1962 dealt mainly with the
wording and length of notice requirements for nonjudicial sales, and had little af-
fect on substantive rights. See, e.g., 1977 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 44; 1972 Alaska
Sess. Laws ch. 3; 1966 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 19.
139. Conrad v. Counsellors Inv. Co., 751 P.2d 10, 12 (Alaska 1988).
140. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.45.170,34.20.070 (Michie 1996).
141. Id. § 09.45.170.
142. See id. § 09.45.170, .35.010.
143. See id. § 09.35.140(2).
144. See id.
145. Id.
146. Moening v. Alaska Mut. Bank, 751 P.2d 5, 7 (Alaska 1988) (quoting
ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070) (Michie 1996)).
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Before the trustee's sale can occur, the trustee must first satisfy
certain notice requirements. Not less than thirty days after the de-
fault and at least three months before the date of sale, the trustee
must record a notice of default at the office of the local recorder.1 47
No more than ten days after filing the notice of default, the trustee
must then either mail a copy of the notice to the debtor or serve it
in person.'4' The trustee must also give public notice of the sale in
the same manner as is required for judicial foreclosure.149 Once
these requirements have been met, the trustee may conduct an
auction sale of the property and deliver a deed for the property to
the purchaser."'
2. Redemption. In Alaska, the common law right of equitable
redemption is available to debtors in both judicial and nonjudicial
proceedings.' If the debtor pays the court clerk the full amount
due on the debt plus costs at any time before the court renders ajudgment of foreclosure, the action will be dismissed.' If the
debtor pays the debt after the judgment is rendered, but before the
foreclosure sale, the judgment will be terminated and the
execution recalled.53 If, in a nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding,
the default is due to a failure to make payments, and if at any time
before the foreclosure sale the debtor pays the amount that would
then be due if no default had occurred, in addition to attorney's
fees and costs, the default is considered cured and the deed of trust
is reinstated."5 However, if the debtor has cured the deed of trust
in this manner twice or more previously, the trustee may elect to
refuse payment of the amount due and may continue to foreclose
the security.55
In addition to the right of equitable redemption, in a judicial
foreclosure proceeding, the debtor has a statutory right to redeem
the property following the foreclosure sale, in which case the sale
is terminated and the estate is restored.'56 The debtor may exercise
this right by repaying the purchase money, with interest, plus any
147. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.70.
148. See id. § 34.20.70(c).
149. See id. § 34.20.080.
150. See id. § 34.20.070.
151. See id §§ 09.45.220,34.20.070(b).
152. See id. § 09.45.220.
153. See id.
154. See id. § 34.20.070.
155. See id.
156. See id. §§ 09.45.190, .35.210, .35.220, .35.260; Moening v. Alaska Mut.
Bank, 751 P.2d 5,7 (Alaska 1988).
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taxes and expenses incurred by the purchaser, within twelve
months of the order confirming the sale." The purchaser is enti-
tled to possession of the property from the time of the sale until
the debtor exercises the right to redemption.5 ' Following a nonju-
dicial foreclosure sale, the mortgagor has "no right or privilege to
redeem the property, unless the deed of trust so declares." '159
3. Deficiency judgments. As was mentioned above, a court
issuing a judgment of foreclosure should include as part of that
judgment a deficiency decree determining the personal liability of
the debtor for the full payment of the debt, thereby providing
deficiency judgments in foreclosure suits."6  As a result, "[a]
deficiency between the amount of the judgment and the sale price
[of the security] may be enforced by execution [against the
personal property of the debtor]."'' A creditor is not entitled to a
deficiency judgment, or any action to recover a deficiency,
following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.'62
4. One-action rule. Alaska's one-action rule traditionally has
applied only when the creditor elects to pursue nonjudicial
foreclosure. Once a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has been made,
"no other or further action or proceeding may be taken nor
judgment entered against the [debtor] on the obligation secured by
the deed of trust."' Thus, by electing to foreclose nonjudicially,
the creditor bars any future action to foreclose the security
judicially or to sue on the underlying note."4 When a creditor has
chosen judicial remedies to collect on a secured debt, there have
been no statutory provisions preventing the creditor from pursuing
judicial foreclosure and an action on the note concurrently or
consecutively to collect on the full value of the debt. Indeed, state
statutes specifically allow a creditor to collect on a deficiency
following a judicial foreclosure sale as part of the same action,6 ' or
to supplement a successful, yet unsatisfied suit on the note with
157. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.35.250.
158. See id. § 09.35.310.
159. ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.090(a); accord Moening, 751 P.2d at 7.
160. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.170; see also Hammer v. Alaska-Ebner Gold
Mines Co., 6 Alaska 193,201-02 (1919).
161. ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.180; see also id. § 09.35.030; Dikeman v. Jewel Gold
Mining Co., 7 Alaska 361, 364 (1925), aff'd, 13 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1926).
162. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100.
163. Id.
164. See Smith v. Shortall, 732 P.2d 548,549 (Alaska 1987).
165. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.170; Smith, 732 P.2d at 549.
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independent judicial foreclosure of the security. 166
B. Legislative and Judicial Developments
The secured transaction statutory scheme described above has
been in place since the early days of the Alaska legislature. In
1983, at the request of the Alaska Legislative Council, the Rules
Committee of the state House of Representatives proposed a bill
that was intended "to provide fair and uniform treatment of real
property security interests, regardless of form. '1 67 If enacted, this
bill would have replaced title 34, chapter 20 of the Alaska Statutes,
entitled Mortgages and Trust Deeds, with a new chapter 21, enti-
tled Security Interests in Real Property.1 6' The bill would have
continued to uphold most of the rights, remedies and duties under
the current law. However, it would have repealed Alaska Statutes
section 09.45.200 (barring foreclosure without an execution of
judgment returned unsatisfied) and added a requirement that for
nonjudicial foreclosure, notice of sale must be given to all inter-
ested parties and posted on the property itself.'69
In listing the remedies available to a secured creditor, the
proposed bill stated that the creditor could judicially foreclose on
the security or sue on the note "in any order or simultaneously,"
but if the property was sold nonjudicially, the creditor would have
to dismiss any pending judicial actions.7 Also, instead of requiring
a sale at public auction for nonjudicial foreclosure, the bill would
have allowed sale of the property "at any time and place and on
any terms" so long as the sale was "commercially reasonable. 7 1 If
electing foreclosure by a "commercially reasonable" sale, the
creditor would have been able to enter the property to show it to
prospective buyers once thirty days had passed following notice of
intent to sell.'7 The creditor would also have been able to take
possession of the property in order to prepare it for sale once sixty
days had passed from notice of intent to sell.173
Although the House assigned the bill to the Labor and Com-
merce, Judiciary, and Rules Committees, it did not enact this leg-
islation during the Thirteenth Legislature. Identical bills were
166. See ALASrA STAT. § 09.45.200.
167. H.R. 341, 13th Leg., 1st Sess., § 1 (Alaska 1983).
168. See id. §§ 2,5.
169. See id.






taken up by the House in the Fourteenth Legislature in 1985 and
by the Senate and the House in the Fifteenth Legislature in 1987,
but these bills never made it out of committee.' 4
In February of 1988, the Alaska Supreme Court added its
voice to the debate over rights appurtenant to security interests in
real property. In two decisions handed down on the same day,
7 5
the court surveyed the remedies available to creditors holding de-
faulted notes secured by deeds of trust. In Moening v. Alaska
Mutual Bank,16 the court contrasted the remedies of judicial and
nonjudicial foreclosure, stating the manner in which creditors'
remedies are balanced by corresponding debtors' rights.'7 In judi-
cial foreclosure, the creditor's right to a deficiency judgment is
balanced with a debtor's statutory right to post-sale redemption,
while in nonjudicial foreclosure the creditor is not entitled to a de-
ficiency judgment, so the debtor is not entitled to redeem the
property unless a right of redemption is included in the deed of
trust.
78
The court then listed a third possible remedy, an action on the
note. Prior to the decision, the courts had not interpreted section
09.45.200, which on its face states that a creditor may not maintain
a foreclosure action during or after the pendency of a suit on the
note, unless the suit on the note is successful yet unsatisfied.17 The
Moening court held that the statute was a clear indication that the
legislature intended a remedy whereby the creditor may ignore the
security and sue directly on the note, and "[m]oreover, if the credi-
tor prevails in the legal action and cannot satisfy the judgment
against the debtor's personal property, it may then maintain an ac-
tion for judicial foreclosure of the security."' Responding to the
argument that this does not mean the creditor can remedy a defi-
ciency from the judgment on the note with a nonjudicial foreclo-
sure sale, the court held that while section 34.20.100 prohibits a de-
ficiency judgment following nonjudicial foreclosure, it does not
preclude nonjudicial foreclosure following a deficiency judgment
174. See H.R. 245, 14th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1985); H.R. 321, 15th Leg., 1st
Sess. (Alaska 1987); S. 305, 15th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 1987).
175. Moening v. Alaska Mut. Bank, 751 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1988); Conrad v. Coun-
sellors Inv. Co., 751 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1988).
176. 751 P.2d 5 (Alaska 1988).
177. See id. at 7-8.
178. See id.
179. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.45.200 (Michie 1996).
180. Moening, 751 P.2d at 8.
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on the note."' Furthermore, the court suggested that action on the
note and foreclosure proceedings are not inconsistent remedies,
since "'[a] judgment recovered upon a debt secured by a mortgage
does not merge the mortgage nor operate as a discharge, aban-
donment, or release of the mortgage security.. '.. Since there is no
statutory prohibition against the application of both remedies and
they are not inconsistent, the court held that "[o]nce the creditor
obtains a personal judgment which is returned unsatisfied in whole
or in part, the creditor may judicially or nonjudicially foreclose the
security."'"3
In Conrad v. Counsellors Investment Co.,' handed down the
same day as Moening, the court stated "[tihe fact that a creditor
may foreclose nonjudicially does not imply that it may not fore-
close judicially.""' In such a case, the court held, a creditor is
"entitled to exercise any other remedies permitted by law," unless
the creditor's remedies are "expressly waived in the note or deed
of trust."'' 6 In Conrad, the debtor argued that foreclosure subse-
quent to a suit on the note would nevertheless be precluded by the
doctrine of res judicata. The court reasoned that while this ar-
gument had merit, the common law and the court's own interpreta-
tion of section 09.45.200 allow foreclosure following an action on
the note.' Thus, the court reasoned that the section should be
viewed as "an express statutory exception to general principles of
res judicata" or, in the alternative, "a special form of execution on
the prior judgment."'89 In dicta, the court suggested that failure to
join a deficiency claim in a judicial foreclosure complaint may pre-
clude any subsequent action on the note, because there is no ex-
press statutory exception that allows a creditor to proceed in this
manner. IS
Shortly after these two decisions were handed down, and per-
haps prompted by the Moening decision, John Abbott, Chairman
of the Alaska Code Revision Commission, proposed that the Sen-
181. See id.
182. Id. at 10 (quoting Silver v. Williams, 175 A.2d 673, 676 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1961), rev'd on other grounds, 178 A.2d 649 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1962)).
183. Id. at 8.
184. 751 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1988).
185. Id. at 12.
186. Id. at 12-13.
187. See id. at 13.
188. See id
189. Id.
190. See id at 13 n.8.
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ate Judiciary Committee revise Senate Bill 305 in order to allow
redemption following a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.'9' Although
this proposal was backed by Senator Pat Rodey,' 92 it died along
with the bill when the bill was held over and never enacted. How-
ever, shortly thereafter two other bills concerning secured transac-
tions were introduced.
In late March, 1988, the House considered House Bill 549,
sponsored by Representative Steve Rieger, that would have added
a new section to Title 34, Chapter 20.'93 The bill required affirma-
tive notice in the note secured by the deed of trust of all recourse
and remedies available to the creditor in the event of a default, and
notice of the option to ignore the security in favor of a suit on the
note.14 If the note did not contain such notice, the creditor could
only resort to nonjudicial foreclosure in the event of a default, and
would not be able to initiate any subsequent action to collect on a
deficiency."5
While reviewing the bill in April, 1988, the House Labor and
Commerce Committee, under pressure from lending institutions,
changed the wording in order to ease the notice requirement and
the penalty if such notice was missing."' The new committee sub-
stitute provided that the note must give notice only if the creditor
wishes to reserve the right to ignore the security and sue on the
note.' A creditor that did not give such notice would not be able
to sue on the note, but would still retain the options of judicial or
nonjudicial foreclosure. The committee substitute also added a
clause that sufficient notice would state that the creditor could sue
on the note to satisfy the debt "either before or after a judicial
foreclosure of the deed of trust."'' When it reviewed the commit-
tee substitute at the end of April, the House Judiciary Committee
changed the wording so that the bill would apply to mortgages as
well as deeds of trust, and stated that this amendment would be-
come the new section 34.20.160. 9
191. See Hearings on S. 305 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 15th Leg., 2d
Sess. 1340 (Alaska 1988) (statement of John Abbott, Chairman, Alaska Code Re-
vision Commission).
192. See id.
193. See H.R. 549, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska 1988).
194. See id.
195. See id.




199. See Judiciary Committee Substitute for H.R. 549, 15th Leg., 2d Sess.
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At the same time House Bill 549 was winding through the
legislative process, the Senate introduced Senate Bill 515, which
would have amended section 34.20.070, the statute establishing
nonjudicial foreclosure sales.m Introduced in late April, the bill
stated that a judgment resulting from judicial foreclosure or a suit
on the note extinguished the trust deed and the note, and that the
creditor would be unable to thereafter foreclose nonjudicially.?
The bill added that any execution resulting from a suit on the note
or from judicial foreclosure would have to proceed against the se-
curity before turning to other personal property of the debtor.'
Finally, the bill provided that, if passed, it would take effect imme-
diately.
After several hearings on the bill in the Judiciary Committee,
the committee substituted its own amended version of the bill.'
This version deleted the language providing that the deed of trust
and the note would be extinguished if the creditor received a
judgment from a judicial remedy.25 Instead, the committee substi-
tute provided that if the creditor received a judgment from a suit
on the note or judicial foreclosure, the creditor could not then
foreclose nonjudicially.' The committee substitute also elimi-
nated the provision that the creditor must exhaust the security be-
fore turning to the debtor's personal property.' Like the earlier
draft, the committee substitute provided that the bill would take
effect immediately, but added a section stating that it would apply
to any judicial proceedings in progress, or that had not resulted in
a completed foreclosure sale or a final judgment before the effec-
tive date of the Act.2
This Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 515 was adopted by
the Senate and transmitted to the House for consideration, where
it was referred to the Judiciary Committee? While the committee
made no changes to the language of the Senate committee substi-
(Alaska 1988).










209. See Senate Journal, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. 3343 (May 2, 1988); House Journal,
15th Leg., 2d Sess. 3640 (May 8, 1988).
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tute, it created its own substitute that inserted the final version of
House Bill 549 as a new section of Senate Bill 515.20 This last ver-
sion of Senate Bill 515 was passed by the House and the Senate,
and was signed into law effective May 24, 1988. As a result, section
34.20.070 was amended, so that if a creditor elects judicial foreclo-
sure or action on the note rather than nonjudicial foreclosure, the
211
creditor cannot subsequently resort to nonjudicial foreclosure.
In addition, section 34.20.160 was added, providing that a creditor
has no right to ignore the security and pursue an action on the un-
derlying note unless that right is specifically reserved in the mort-
gage or deed of trust.
212
Iv. THE BALANCE OF POLICY GOALS: A STATE-BY-STATE
COMPARISON
A. Policy Goals in Alaska
As in other states, secured transaction law in Alaska is de-
signed to further two general policy goals: to protect the interests
of borrowers, particularly individual homeowners and small busi-
nesses, and to facilitate lenders' efforts to collect the full debt obli-
gation on defaulted loans, which will thereby encourage lending.
Implementation of these very different and usually contradictory
goals is guided by further derivative policy considerations. In care-
fully constructing a detailed statutory scheme to govern loans se-
cured by real property, the Alaska legislature and courts aim to
maintain a balance between the rights and remedies available to
debtors and creditors.
One reason legislators seek to protect borrowers in secured
loan transactions is that the very nature of loan arrangements puts
the creditor in a superior bargaining position, which can easily re-
sult in creditor abuses. However, commercial borrowers are usu-
ally not as disadvantaged as residential borrowers because they
represent ongoing business opportunities for creditors. As a result,
debtor protections in some states are limited based upon whether
the debtor is a commercial or residential borrower.
There is also a strong political motivation to protect borrow-
ers. A common type of loan transaction secured by real property
is the home mortgage or home equity loan, and homeowners are a
210. See House Committee Substitute for S. 515, 15th Leg., 2d Sess. (Alaska
1988).
211. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070 (Michie 1996).
212. See id. § 34.20.160.
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particularly large and powerful voting group. While one might ar-
gue that only those homeowners who have defaulted on their
mortgages will be seriously affected by secured transaction stat-
utes, appraisal values of all homes are affected by the total number
of foreclosure properties on the market and the prices those prop-
erties command at foreclosure sales.
The recession that hit Alaska in the latter half of the 1980's is
perhaps the best example of how debtors and homeowners are
linked.213 Thousands of workers lost their jobs and came to realize
that they owed more on their mortgages than the properties were
worth. They then abandoned their mortgages and moved to other
states, leaving a huge number of foreclosures in their wake."4
Nearly one in twelve mortgage holders in the Anchorage area lost
property to foreclosures at that time, and the number of foreclo-
sures grew from 263 in the first quarter of 1985 to approximately
1,700 per quarter by early 1988.21 Attempts by institutional lend-
ers to liquidate their vast inventories of these foreclosed properties
only made matters worse, as they "helped to stimulate the plunge
in residential real estate prices.",216 By 1988, single-family homes in
Anchorage were selling for twenty-five to thirty percent less than
their original purchase price, and condominium values had
dropped by up to seventy-five percent. Thus, it is easy to see
how legislators' efforts to protect mortgage debtors can, in the
right circumstances, have an appreciable impact on the economy as
a whole.
While homeowners certainly exert strong political pressure on
the Alaska legislature, banks and other lending institutions have a
great deal of political clout as well. Since much of financial institu-
213. This recession, which began in 1985, was caused by an "economy badly
overheated by a spending binge, [which] was [then] rocked by a sudden decline in
oil prices." Ken Wells, Alaska Economy Still Feeling Effects of Oil Collapse,
SEATrLE TIMES, Nov. 29, 1988, at B1. The combination of these two factors
"set off an economic crash that j] ravaged parts of the state's real-estate market,
crushed half of its banks and left its linchpin construction industry battered and
struggling for survival." Id. Since the oil industry produces 89% of the gross state
product, state employment dropped from 233,000 jobs in 1985 to 207,000 jobs in
late 1987. See Bill Dietrich, Chill Winds Still Blow: But Alaskans Say Their Econ-
omy Can Only Start Looking Up, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 21, 1988, at D1. As a
result, many people left Alaska in search of a healthier economy, with approxi-
mately 29,000 leaving Anchorage, representing 12% of its residents. See id.
214. See Dietrich, supra note 213, at D1.
215. See id.
216. Collins, supra note 5, at 14.
217. See Dietrich, supra note 213, at D1.
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tions' profit comes from lending activities, they depend on keeping
bad debt to a minimum. If a state's foreclosure laws do not suffi-
ciently facilitate the ability of lenders to collect on the full value of
defaulted loans, lending institutions will either fail or begin to in-
vest their money in states with statutory schemes more favorable
to creditors. 28 Loss of investment funds in this manner will affect
the entire community as real estate development dries up, causing
interest rates for homeowners, small businesses and other borrow-
ers to rise. The recession in Alaska in the 1980's is a good example
of how important efficient debt foreclosure laws are to lending in-
stitutions. Workers fled from the state, leaving behind a glut of
foreclosures that could not be sold on the open market. The real
estate market subsequently collapsed, and eight banks failed in
Anchorage alone.
Therefore, in order to best protect their constituencies - and
their own political fortunes - for the long term, legislators must
craft statutory schemes that maintain a balance between creditors'
and debtors' rights and remedies. Generally, the components of
secured transaction statutes are the same throughout the states; it
is the manner in which states limit or combine these components
that makes states unique. To determine if Alaska has balanced the
interests of creditors with those of debtors, and whether it has fa-
vored one over the other, it is instructive to compare the statutory
scheme in Alaska with those of the other states examined in Sec-
tion II.
B. Alaska in Comparison
From the point of view of lending institutions, the ideal se-
cured transaction scheme is one that allows them to recover the
full value of the debt obligation quickly and efficiently. The key to
full recovery of the debt, especially in times of depressed land val-
ues, is the ability to reach not only the security, but also the
debtor's other personal property. Thus lending institutions seek to
maximize their freedom and flexibility in choosing and combining
remedies once a default occurs. Debtors, on the other hand, often
do not understand that they have contracted to put their personal
property at risk. In their eyes, the very purpose of a mortgage or
deed of trust is to limit to a particular piece of property the secu-
rity for repayment of the loan. It is the debtor's expectation that in
218. See Hearings on S. 515 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 15th Leg., 2d
Sess. 0950 (Alaska 1988) (statement of Ed van Patten, representing Alaska Fed-
eral Bank and Alaska Bank's Association).
219. See Richardson, supra note 5, at 33.
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return for his or her designation of property as a security, the
creditor has agreed to collect on the security if a default occurs.
Thus, to best protect the expectations of the debtor, a state statu-
tory scheme should limit the creditor's remedies to foreclosure of
the security, and not allow a preemptive action on the note.
Notwithstanding debtor expectations, on their face all four of
the statutory schemes examined in this Note offer at least the pos-
sibility of an action on the note before recourse is made to the se-
curity. In Oregon and Washington, it is settled law that a creditor
may ignore the security and sue on the note.m In contrast, while it
is possible to ignore the security and sue on the note in California,
the state's one-action rule has restricted this right to such an extent
that it now barely exists.21 Alaska falls somewhere in the middle
in terms of remedies offered.
While it is possible for a creditor in Alaska to ignore the secu-
rity and sue on the note, it may do so only if it has explicitly re-
served this right under the terms of the note.m This notice re-
quirement was prompted by a desire to fulfill the expectations of
the parties at the time they drafted the note and the security
agreement, and by the manner in which lender expectations
changed following the recession in the 1980's.m Until the statute
was revised in 1988,
bankers ha[d] never given any serious thought to the question
[of] suing on the note apart from foreclosing on the security ....
The bankers didn't think in terms of suing on the note because..
. it was always the expectations of all the parties, the bankers in-
cluded, that the security would always be sufficient to satisfy the
underlying indebtedness"A
Following the recession, however, "banks [were] not inter-
ested in taking the security back."' They now wanted to turn di-
rectly to the note, without wasting time attempting to sell a deval-
ued asset in a depleted market. Thus, in enacting section
34.20.160, the Alaska legislature wanted to ensure that contracting
parties clearly understand whether the creditor has the right to sue
on the note before foreclosing. So long as the parties agree that
the creditor does have such a right, then the creditor may use the
220. See supra notes 75, 104 and accompanying text
221. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
222. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.160 (Michie 1996).
223. See Hearings on S. 515 Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 15th Leg., 2d






right to sue on the note freely, either before, during or after a fore-
closure action. For this reason, the Alaska statute, while having
more restrictive remedies than Oregon or Washington, is not as
severe as the provisions in California.
The greatest concession legislatures have made to creditors'
rights is the provision for nonjudicial foreclosure. So long as the
deed of trust contains a power of sale, all four of the states exam-
ined in this Note allow creditors the option of nonjudicial foreclo-
sure. =
6
The overview of judicial foreclosure procedures provided in
Parts II and III make it clear that notice requirements, lengthy
waiting periods and other administrative rules for judicial foreclo-
sure make that option a more complicated, expensive and time-
consuming process than nonjudicial foreclosure. The primary goal
of state legislatures in writing nonjudicial foreclosure statutes is to
equip lenders with a process that provides a quicker, easier and
less expensive means to foreclose on the security.
Although it is the remedy most beneficial to the creditor,
nonjudicial foreclosure is the remedy most harmful to the debtor's
interests. These interests are best summed up as (1) avoiding the
loss of the security, and (2) if avoiding foreclosure is not possible,
then maximizing the price realized on the property at the foreclo-
sure sale. Judicial foreclosure is the option most favorable to the
debtor, and nonjudicial foreclosure is most favorable to the credi-
tor. Since the choice of pursuing judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure
is left to the creditor, without any extra enticements to choose ju-
dicial foreclosure, the creditor would nearly always elect nonjudi-
cial foreclosure. To maintain some semblance of balance between
the two types of remedies, and consequently between creditors'
and debtors' protections, legislatures have added certain creditor
benefits to judicial foreclosure but not to nonjudicial foreclosure,
and certain debtor benefits to nonjudicial foreclosure, but not to
judicial foreclosure.
In judicial foreclosure, the court's greater control over the
226. See supra notes 48-50, 80, 112, 146 and accompanying text. The one ex-
ception, as noted above, is that nonjudicial foreclosure is not allowed in Washing-
ton if the security is used primarily for farming or agricultural purposes. See supra
note 112 and accompanying text. Also, in Oregon a creditor can resort to nonju-
dicial foreclosure only if the note is secured by a deed of trust, rather than a
mortgage. See supra note 76 and accompanying text. This provision has little
substantive effect, however, since in all states that allow nonjudicial foreclosure,




proceedings gives it a larger influence over the price received. The
downside for creditors, as mentioned above, is that the process is
lengthy and expensive. Accordingly, legislatures will often include
deficiency judgments as part of the same action for judicial fore-
closure, but will not allow deficiency judgments in nonjudicial
foreclosure actions.' This is true in each of the four statutory
schemes studied in this note, and three of the four add further limi-
tations to the availability of deficiency judgments in judicial fore-
closure proceedings. Both California and Oregon do not allow de-
ficiency judgments if the mortgage involved is a purchase money
mortgage or a residential trust deed.m Washington only allows de-
ficiency judgments if they are provided for in the note or security
agreement. Alaska, on the other hand, adds no limitations to its
provisions for deficiency judgments, and is thus for creditors the
most favorable of the four.
Another debtor protection that is closely related to anti-
deficiency statutes is the one-action rule. Traditionally, the com-
mon law allows a creditor to pursue all remedies available to it ei-
ther concurrently or subsequently." In this manner, the creditor
may use concurrent claims to pursue alternative remedies, or may
use subsequent actions to collect on deficiencies from prior ac-
tions. Several states have passed statutes, called one-action rules,
that prevent creditors from using subsequent claims to recover de-
ficiencies.
California's one-action rule is the best known and most re-
strictive. It states that there can only be one form of action on a
defaulted loan obligation, and that the action should be one of the
two foreclosure options."1 In this manner, the rule is a "security-
first" rule, and once the creditor has chosen one remedy to pursue,
it is prevented from pursuing any other form of recovery.
Oregon technically does not have a one-action rule. However,
a creditor is not entitled to a deficiency judgment on a purchase
money mortgage, so if the creditor is successful on one claim, it
must then dismiss any other claims that are pending on the same
security arrangement." Also, a creditor may not begin nonjudicial
foreclosure proceedings if any other action has been filed pursuing
227. See supra notes 57, 64, 90-94, 127, 132 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 61, 99 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
230. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
231. See CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West Supp. 1997).
232. See id.
233. See OR. REv. STAT. § 88.070 (1988).
[Vol. 14:1110
ALASKA FORECLOSURE LAW
either of the other two remedies.2"
Under Washington's one-action statute, a creditor cannot
foreclose the security concurrently with an action on the note, and
vice versa." The creditor can, however, wait until a judgment
from one of the remedies has been exhausted and then begin a suit
using the other remedy. This is not true for nonjudicial foreclo-
sure, which satisfies the obligation regardless of the price re-
ceived.2s In this manner, once a creditor completes a nonjudicial
foreclosure sale, it can no longer begin judicial foreclosure or a suit
on the note.
Alaska's one-action plan is the least restrictive of the four, and
thus the most favorable to creditors. The only restriction as to
concurrent or separate actions is that no other action may be taken
on the debt once a nonjudicial foreclosure sale has been com-
pleted,' and a nonjudicial foreclosure sale is notpermitted once
the creditor elects either of the judicial remedies."l In the after-
math of the recession in the second half of the 1980's, various pro-
posals were introduced further to limit sequential use of the vari-
ous remedies.24 However, even though the legislature and the
Alaska Supreme Court indicated a desire to restrict creditors'
remedies, the only restriction that actually occurred (the 1988
amendment to section 31.20.070) was minimal. Alaska has thus
remained one of the more generous states in terms of allowing
creditors to combine concurrent or subsequent claims in order to
recover the full debt obligation.
Due to the risk of double recovery and other hardships debt-
ors face when deficiency judgments are available,24' legislatures
usually balance deficiency judgments with several protections for
the debtor. One basic protection is the inclusion of lengthy waiting
periods as part of judicial foreclosure proceedings. By extending
the length of time during which the debtor may utilize equitable
redemption, a right recognized in all states, the legislatures give
debtors a better opportunity to prevent the foreclosure sale. States
may also increase the length of the redemption period by granting
statutory rights of redemption that may be exercised after the
234. See id. § 86.735(4).
235. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.12.060 (West 1990).
236. See id. § 61.12.120.
237. See id.
238. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.100 (Michie 1996).
239. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
240. See supra notes 193-208 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
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foreclosure sale. Thus if a creditor is allowed post-sale redemption
rights, the state will usually not grant it a lengthy waiting period,
and vice versa. It should be noted that redemption rights, in addi-
tion to making a sale more difficult, also tend to drive up the fore-
closure sale price.
California requires a 120-day waiting period in judicial fore-
closure proceedings if the debtor has no right of redemption. 2
The debtor has no right of redemption if the creditor has no right
to a deficiency judgment.243 If a deficiency judgment is available,
the debtor has a one-year right of redemption. In Oregon, credi-
tors have a 120-day waiting period for nonjudicial foreclosure ac-
tions, but no lengthy delay for judicial foreclosure. 5 In return,
debtors in judicial foreclosure proceedings are granted a post-sale
right of redemption, which runs 180 days2m In Washington, credi-
tors have a 190-day waiting period for nonjudicial foreclosure, but
no lengthy delay for judicial foreclosure. Thus the debtor has re-
demption rights for one year following a judicial foreclosure sale. 8
In Alaska, nonjudicial foreclosure requires a 120-day waiting pe-
riod, whereas judicial foreclosure has no such restriction.249 Ac-
cordingly, there is a one-year redemption period following a judi-
cial foreclosure sale, but none following a nonjudicial foreclosure
sale.'
Another protection that states sometimes offer debtors in or-
der to counter the effect of deficiency judgments is the ability to
reinstate the mortgage or deed of trust by paying the outstanding
balance due had there been no default. This is a different, easier
way to prevent a foreclosure sale. California offers debtors rein-
statement rights in both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure ac-
tions.2' In Washington, Oregon and Alaska, only debtors in non-
242. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 701.545 (West 1997).
243. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
244. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 729.010 (West Supp. 1997). The redemption
period is shortened to three months if the foreclosure sale price is sufficient to
cover the full loan obligation. See id.
245. See supra notes 77-79, 82 and accompanying text.
246. See OR. REV. STAT. §§ 88.080,23.560 (1980).
247. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.030(g) (West 1990).
248. See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text. The redemption period is
shortened to eight months if the land is not used for farming purposes and the
creditor does not have a right to a deficiency judgment. See supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
249. See supra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
250. See supra notes 157, 159 and accompanying text.
251. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
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judicial proceedings have reinstatement rights.' 2 Alaska limits the
right even further, providing that once a debtor cures the deed in
this manner twice or more, the creditor may elect to refuse pay-
ment and continue with foreclosure. 3
A final protection for debtors, aimed at driving up foreclosure
prices, is fair value or minimum bid provisions.' California and
Washington have fair value rules, whereas Oregon and Alaska do
not."5 Instead, Alaska has a weaker provision that allows the court
to order a resale of the property if it determines there were
"substantial irregularities" in the first sale, a solution that is both
vague and too indirect. 6
Compared to California, Oregon fnd Washington, Alaska's
secured transaction law is the most favorable to creditors.
Alaska's provisions for anti-deficiency and one-action rules are the
most lenient of the four. Alaska's post-sale rights of redemption
provisions are average among the group. Although the state does
offer reinstatement rights, it adds a restriction to those rights that
is not found in any of the other three states. While Alaska allows a
court to order a resale if there are "substantial irregularities" in
the proceedings at the first sale, this language is vague and seems
to offer little support in keeping foreclosure prices high. Finally,
while the addition of section 34.20.160 did help clarify the expecta-
tions of parties in drawing up deeds of trust, it does little to limit
creditor remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
On the surface, the recent addition of section 34.20.160 to the
statutory scheme and the amendment to section 34.20.70 seem to
push the balance of secured transaction law in Alaska toward the
protection of debtors. While these changes do shift the balance
somewhat, a closer inspection shows that the effect is not signifi-
cant. For instance, section 34.20.160 only clarifies the expectations
of contracting parties, and does little to limit creditor remedies. In
fact, the language the statute proposes for inclusion in deeds of
trust would actually increase creditors' available remedies from the
level of rights suggested by the Alaska Supreme Court in Coun-
252. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070 (Michie 1996); OR. REv. STAT. § 86.753
(1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.030.
253. See ALASKA STAT. § 34.20.070.
254. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
255. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 729.010 (West Supp. 1997); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 62.23.060 (West 1990).




Given the widespread effect the recession of the late 1980's
had on the entire Alaska economy, it is surprising that it did not
trigger stronger reform of creditors' rights. While banks admit-
tedly suffered a great deal, it would seem the tremendous plunge in
the value of housing and the crash of the real estate market would
have had a greater effect on the legislature. When compared to
the majority of states, which do not have anti-deficiency or one-
action legislation, Alaska is certainly more favorable to debtors.
However, when compared to those states that do have such legisla-
tion, like the three others studied in this Note, or when tallying the
weight of creditors' rights against those accorded debtors, Alaska
is certainly more favorable to creditors.
Given the boom or bust economy of the state, both borrowers
and lenders in Alaska are in greater need of statutory protections
than those in most other states. While Alaska currently offers
lenders a solid array of remedies and protections, there is still
much the legislature can do to better protect borrowers. The leg-
islature should therefore consider moving the balance more to-
wards the center.
Joseph E. Gotch Jr.
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